Key pre-distribution is a well-known technique for ensuring secure communication among sensors deployed in an ad-hoc manner to form a sensor network. Secure paths can be established between any two sensors, where adjacent sensors on the path share a (predistributed) secret key. Several results have been presented recently on random key predistribution schemes [6] and [2] . In this paper, we propose a novel 2-Phase technique for key predistribution based on a combination of inherited and random key assignments from the given key pool to individual sensor nodes. We also develop an analytical framework for measuring security-performance tradeoffs of different key distribution schemes by providing metrics for measuring sensornet connectivity and resiliency to enemy attacks. In particular, we show analytically that the 2-Phase scheme provides better average connectivity and superior q-composite connectivity than the random scheme. We then prove that the invulnerability of a communication link under arbitrary number of node captures by an adversary is higher under the 2-Phase scheme. We also show analytically that the vulnerability of an arbitrary communication link to single node capture is lower under 2-Phase assuming both an omniscient adversary and an average-case adversary. Finally we present several simulation results for these and other metrics regarding network connectivity and resiliency.
Introduction
Sensor networks are autonomous systems of tiny sensor nodes equipped with integrated sensing and data processing capabilities. They can be deployed on a large scale in resource-limited and harsh environments such as seismic zones, ecological contamination sites or battlefields [1] , [8] . Their ability to acquire spatiotemporally dense data in hazardous and unstructured environments makes them attractive for a wide variety of applications [4, 17, 21] .
Sensor networks (sensornets) are distinguished from typical ad-hoc wireless networks by their stringent resource constraints and larger scale. These operational constraints impose severe security challenges since sensornets may be deployed in hostile environments where nodes are subject to capture and communication links are subject to monitoring [13, 18, 23, 22, 16] .
Nodes in a sensornet are typically deployed in an ad-hoc manner into arbitrary topologies before selforganizing into a multihop network for collecting data from the environment and forwarding to the base station or sink [1] , [5] . Establishing a secure communication infrastructure among a collection of arbitrarily deployed sensor nodes is an important and challenging security problem (known as the bootstrapping problem [2] ). Due to limited resource constraints, symmetric key cryptography is the most feasible encryption mechanism for node to node communication. However, the ad-hoc deployment of sensor nodes makes it impossible to pre-determine the neighborhood of any node, thereby making traditional methods of key exchange and key distribution protocols based on trusted third party mechanisms infeasible. Moreover, given the limited memory capacity at sensor nodes, key distribution schemes must ensure good network connectivity even with limited number of keys per node. Given the impracticality of secure online (post-deployment) key distribution, alternative mechanisms for ensuring secure communication between adjacent sensor nodes must be found. One attractive possibility is key predistribution, i.e. pre-installing a limited number of keys in sensor nodes prior to actual deployment. A trivial predistribution solution is to have a single secret key shared among all nodes. While this solution keeps the network fully connected (every node can communicate with every other node) and scalable (new nodes can be added without any keying overhead), it provides extremely poor resiliency to enemy attack. At the opposite end of the spectrum, one can have each pair of nodes sharing a distinct key. This solution provides both high connectivity and high security but is very memory-intensive and not scalable.
There have been several recent works on key pre-distribution [6, 2, 14, 3, 10, 11] . The pioneering paper in [6] proposes a simple, scalable probabilistic key predistribution scheme in which a certain number of keys are drawn at random from a (large) key pool and distributed to sensor nodes prior to their deployment. Post-deployment, adjacent nodes participate in shared key discovery, thereby creating a logical graph. This is followed by the establishment of secure paths between nodes using secure links in the logical graph. In [2] , the authors have presented new mechanisms for key establishment using the random key pre-distribution scheme of [6] as a basis. Their q-composite scheme requires that two adjacent communicating nodes have at least q keys in common. This scheme provides high resiliency against small scale enemy attack. [11] proposes key pre-distribution based on a hash function of node id. This reduces the communication overhead of the shared key discovery phase but may be vulnerable to spoofing.
Note that due to the random distribution of keys and adhoc deployment of sensors, there is a nonnegligible probability of a disconnected logical graph. The degree of connectivity of the resultant sensor network under a given key predistribution scheme is therefore an important performance metric. Note however that there is a strong correlation between network connectivity and network security. Adversaries that capture nodes can be assumed to gain complete information about the keys stored at the node. Thus in order to make the network less vulnerable to node/key capture the overall key pool size must be large. Since individual sensor nodes have limited memory for key storage, this reduces the probability of having a large number of shared keys between neighboring sensors. In this context, the above schemes suffer from a memory resource drawback: for reasonable network connectivity, they require each node to be loaded with a large number of keys.
Good solutions for key pre-distribution must be memory-efficient and scalable, simultaneously ensuring that (a majority of) the network is connected through secure communication links and provide high resiliency to enemy attack so that the capture of a few sensor nodes does not (severely) compromize network communication. Note that these desirable properties include both performance (in terms of connectivity and resource usage) as well as security measures (in terms of resilience to capture). Furthermore, a proper analytical framework for quantification of these criteria is required so that any key pre-distribution mechanism can be fairly evaluated with respect to its security-performance measures.
Our Results:
In this paper, we propose a novel solution to the key predistribution problem (labeled 2-Phase key predistribution) that exploit the key connectivity and capture-resiliency properties of loading sensor nodes with a combination of randomly derived and inherited keys (the random key predistribution scheme can be viewed as a special case of our solution). We evaluate our solution by analytically developing novel quantitative metrics that measure the key predistribution schemes' security-performance tradeoffs in terms of the network resiliency to node/key capture, the number of available secure links and the key (memory) requirement per node for a given level of connectivity. We compare the network connectivity and security performance and show analytically and through simulations that the proposed 2-Phase scheme strongly favors highly secure large-composite key communication and is more resilient to node capture than the random scheme. We first show analytically that the invulnerability of an arbitrary q-composite communication link to any number of node captures is higher in our scheme. We then show that link vulnerability to single node capture under an 'omniscient' adversary is lower in our scheme. We then define a new security-performance metric that incorporates edge vulnerability as well as network connectivity and show that our scheme has superior invulnerability. For connectivity, we show that the probability of any two nodes sharing a key along with the expected number of shared keys between any two nodes is higher under our scheme given the same memory constraints (k keys per node from a key pool of size L). Simulation results also show that the number of exclusive keys shared between any two nodes is higher while the number of q-composite links compromised when a given number of nodes are captured by the enemy is smaller under the 2-Phase scheme as compared to the random one.
Related Work: Overview of the Basic Random Key Distribution Scheme
In general, key management for sensor networks consists of three phases, key pre-distribution, shared key discovery and path establishment. There have been several recent works on key pre-distribution [6, 2, 14, 10, 11] . The pioneering paper in [6] proposes a simple probabilistic key pre-distribution scheme which works as follows: A pool of L keys with key identifiers is generated. For each node, k keys (called the key-ring) are drawn at random from the pool and are installed into the memory of the node. The pool size L is determined in such a way that the probability of having common keys between two randomly chosen sets of keys of size k is at least p. The shared key discovery phase takes place after the deployment of sensor nodes. Each node broadcasts its key identifiers. After discovering a shared key with a neighboring node, a node can verify that the neighbor actually holds the key through a challenge-response protocol. A link is then established using the shared key. A (logical) graph with secured communication links is formed after this phase. During the path establishment phase, a node finds a path through secure links to a neighbor to which it does not share a key. A path key is then established between these two neighbors. However, establishing a path key may not be possible if the logical graph is not connected. Due to random distribution of keys and random deployment of sensors, the chance of a logical graph not being connected is not negligible and can never be totally eliminated. If the shared key discovery phase yields a disconnected logical graph, the sensor nodes perform range extension [2] until a connected logical graph is created. However, in terms of node energy, this procedure is quite expensive for a sensornet.
In [2] , the authors have presented new mechanisms for key establishment using the random key predistribution scheme of [6] as a basis. Their q-composite scheme requires that two adjacent communicating nodes must have at least q keys in common. This scheme provides high resiliency against small scale enemy attack. [11] proposes key predistribution based on a hash function of node id. This reduces the communication overhead of the shared key discovery phase but is vulnerable to spoofing.
In [14] , the authors evaluate the random key predistribution scheme under a variety of non-random node deployment probability distributions. However, for many realistic sensor networks as visualized in Smart Dust [19] , node deployment into known topolgies is an unrealistic assumption. [3] presents an alternative model for secure sensor communication using polynomials rather than keys. The computational constraint of using such polynomials is not extensively evaluated.
For sensornets with significant memory constraints, [12] proposes a deterministic subvector based key predistribution approach based on distributed agreement using vector spaces and quorums [15] . The scheme has the deterministic property that any two nodes sharing a key under a given mapping (out of several possible mappings) from sensor nodes to keys share exactly two keys (that are unique to these two nodes) in this mapping. For a given network deployment, two physically adjacent sensors can encrypt messages using shared keys under one or more of these mappings, where each mapping yields a 2-composite key. It can be shown that any adhoc deployment of sensor nodes yields very high connectivity with low key storage requirements per node.
Two-Phase Key Predistribution Mechanism
We now describe a novel key pre-distribution scheme (labeled 2-Phase) in which sensor nodes are preloaded with a combination of randomly derived and inherited keys. Our proposed 2-Phase scheme is motivated by the following key observations:
• Unlike the subvector scheme [12] with (usually) 2-composite communication, the 2-Phase scheme strongly favors high composite-key communication. Note that q-composite schemes are more secure with increasing q. If the adversary has obtained X keys (through the capture of one or more sensor nodes), the probability of determining the exact q-subset of X that is used by a given communicating sensor pair decreases exponentially with increasing q.
• The random key predistribution schemes treat all nodes and keys uniformly. To satisfy memory constraints, the key-ring size k in these schemes is limited to Θ( (L)), L being the size of the key pool. Under these circumstances, it is less likely that two given nodes will have q keys in common, for large q. Increasing q-connectivity (i.e. the probability of two adjacent nodes sharing at least q keys), for large q, will require making each nodes key space (called key-ring) a significant fraction of the key-pool, thereby making key pool knowledge easier to obtain in case of node capture(s).
• From the connectivity point of view, the probability of having a common key between two nodes decreases as the key pool size increases under the random pre-distribution scheme. We observe that the (probabilistic) connectivity of the logical graph can be increased if we can ensure that each node deterministically shares some of its keys with some nodes (as in the subvector scheme [12] ).
• We hypothesize that it is better from the security point of view to pre-distribute keys in a less-random fashion such that whenever a node shares a key with another node, it should be highly likely to share a large number of keys with this node, If so, the resulting network should consist of more secure q-composite links as compared to the random scheme. At the same time, the mechanism should not require increasing node key space size k as a fraction of the key-pool.
We now describe the key steps in the proposed 2-Phase key predistribution mechanism. Order the sensor nodes apriori in a logical queue and distribute keys in increasing order according to the rules below 1 :
• The first node is assigned k keys drawn randomly from the key pool of size L.
• For every succeeding sensor node, k keys are distributed in two consecutive phases. First, a sensor node receives a predetermined fraction f (0 < f < 1) of its k keys drawn randomly from the key space of the preceeding node. The remaining (1 − f ) fraction of k keys are then drawn randomly from the key pool, after excluding those f k keys which have already been selected from the key ring of the previous node.
The fraction f (called inheritance ratio) plays a significant part in the connectivity of the logical graph created after node deployment. Note that the random key predistribution scheme can be considered to be a special case of the 2-Phase scheme (with f = 0). We will shortly derive relationships between 'good' values of the various parameters k, L, f etc. The proposed 2-Phase scheme is scalable since new sensor nodes can be assigned keys according to this rule at any time. Intuitively, this method of key predistribution should offer better connectivity in the logical graph created after sensor deployment due to the key inheritance property. This property should also induce the sharing of larger number of keys between nodes, thereby better enabling q-composite communication for larger values of q.
Analysis of Secure Connectivity
Since security mechanisms directly impact system performance, there is a strong need to develop a rigorous analytical framework for measuring the security-performance tradeoffs of arbitrary key distribution schemes. These tradeoffs can be represented as functions of individual metrics which measure the networks 'secure' connectivity in terms of the number of available secure links or paths, the memory requirement in terms of keys per node for a given level of connectivity and measuring resiliency of the network to node/key capture. In this paper, we obtain some new analytical results on the security-performance tradeoffs of key predistribution schemes using the quantitative metrics outlined below. Results for the proposed 2-Phase scheme are compared with random key predistribution.
• Connectivity Metrics -Logical sensor degree: We measure the logical degree of a node as the number of adjacent sensor nodes (in the logical graph) with which it shares at least one key. The higher the expected node degree, the better the connectivity of the logical graph. A high expected degree also implies a larger expected number of disjoint paths from any source to any destination. Multiple disjoint paths can be used to split communication and carry disjoint messages, thereby increasing overall data security. We show that nodes under the proposed 2-Phase scheme have higher expected degrees as compared to random key predistribution.
-Number of keys shared between any two neighboring nodes: This metric can be used to evaluate connectivity under q-composite key communication. We show that any two sensor nodes are expected to share more keys and are more likey to share q keys for any value of q (thereby enabling q-composite communication), as compared to random key predistribution.
• Security Metrics -Exclusive Key Sharing: Number of keys exclusive to a pair of nodes: If two communicating nodes share one or more keys exclusively, then their communication is invulnerable to any number of node captures. Note that the exclusivity metric can be computed network-wide or with respect to a local cluster 2 . Strong network wide exclusivity between communicating nodes implies resilience against a powerful adversary who can capture nodes and use the captured key information anywhere in the sensor network. Alternatively, we can consider a weaker adversary who can use the key information only within the cluster of the captured node. For analytically computing exclusivity between a given pair of communicating nodes under single node capture, we first consider an 'omniscient' adversary, who can cleverly choose to capture that node (network-wide) which is most likely to compromise communication between the given pair of nodes. We then consider the vulnerability of communication on a given network edge to the capture of any network node.
-Node Capture: We measure the impact of node capture on network security by considering the number of communication links that are no longer secure (i.e only use keys from the captured key pool). We verify and extend our analytical results through extensive simulations which demonstrate the resilience of the 2-Phase scheme to multiple node captures. We show that the expected number of links compromized in these cases is lower for the 2-Phase scheme as compared to the random scheme. 
The expected q-composite degree of a sensor node (i.e., number of neighbors with which it shares more than q keys) is higher under the two-phase key distribution scheme for all values of f , 0 < f < 1.
Thus nodes share more keys on average under the two-phase scheme which argues for better connectivity. As nodes are more likely to share multiple keys under two-phase, the probability of uncovering all such common keys (which is necessary to decipher data transmissions between the two nodes) can be shown to be lower and hence two-phase is more secure.
6 Network Resiliency against Enemy Attack: Analytical Results
Vulnerability Under Multiple Node Capture: Key Exclusivity
We evaluate the vulnerability of secure q-composite communication in the sensornet to multiple node capture under the strong assumption that an adversary capturing a node(s) obtains full knowledge of all the keys in the key spaces of the captured node(s). An obvious metric for measuring vulnerability is the degree of exclusivity of the keys used by any two neighboring nodes for setting up a q-composite link. We first compute a lower bound on the invulnerability of any logical link by analytically evaluating the probability of the two communicating nodes containing exactly one network-wide exclusive keyIn general, we can compute the probability of two nodes containing at least one exclusive key, but for all practical purposes this probability drops off extremely rapidly for more than one exclusive key. Hence we obtain a simple lower bound on invulnerability by focusing on the presence of a single exclusive key. The presence of one such exclusive key renders the link invulnerable, since no amount of node captures by the adversary can then compromize communication over the given link. We derive the following results: Proposition 3. Key Exclusivity: The probability that a q-composite link between two arbitrary sensors is invulnerable under any number of network-wide node captures by the adversary is given by:
For a given N , optimal values of f , k and L that maximize link invulnerability are given by:
Proposition 4. Scalable Comparitive Exclusivity: The invulnerability of an arbitrary logical link under any number of node captures is higher under 2-Phase as compared to the random scheme whenever
Thus for all practical values of f , k and L, the 2-Phase scheme outperforms the random scheme as the size of the sensornet N scales upward.
Proof. Let IV rand and IV 2P denote the invulnerability of a q-composite link between two arbitrary neighboring sensor nodes i and j under the two key predistribution schemes. In the case of the 2-Phase scheme, i and j represent the LIDs of the communicating nodes. Now consider a specific key α out of the k keys in the keyspace of node i.
For the random scheme, the probability that key α is also found in node j is
The probability that an arbitrary node l = {i, j} does not possess key α is (1 − k L ). Hence the invulnerability of the link between nodes i and j under multiple node capture is given by:
For the 2-Phase scheme, denote: P (l c ) : Probability that a node l does not contain key α. P (l | p): Probability that node l contains key α given that node p also has it.
are defined similarly. Now we have:
We now consider two cases (WLOG assume j > i): Case 1: j = i + 1:
Case 2: j = i + 1:
In both cases, the vulnerability of edge (i, j) is lower under 2-Phase as compared to the random scheme if:
Clearly Equation 9 provides a tighter bound. Note that as the size of the network N increases, for a given value of f , k and L, the left hand side of the equation decreases while the right hand side remains constant, thereby satisfying the inequality. Thus, for larger N , the probability of two nodes having a network wide exclusive key (i.e. link invulnerability) is higher under the two-phase scheme than the random scheme.
Finally, the bounds in proposition 4 can be derived by maximizing Equations 1 and 7 using elementary calculus.
Several other results on network resiliency to attacks on multiple nodes are presented in Section 7.
Link Vulnerability Under Single Node Capture
We now consider the vulnerability of communication links in the sensornet to the capture of a single node by the adversary. Typically, such an adversary should also be restricted in his/her ability to utilize captured key knowledge for link compromization, for example, locally, within the captured nodes' cluster. However for ease of analysis, we first evaluate network resilience under a network-wide adversary who can use knowledge of captured keys to compromize communication in any part of the network (regardless of the physical location of the captured node). The results can be easily extended to the case where the adversary can only utilize captured key knowledge locally. We consider three metrics: 1) link vulnerability to worst-case node capture; 2) link vulnerability to average-case node capture; and 3) expected number of links compromized by a single node capture.
Omniscient Adversary
We first consider the case of an 'omniscient' adversary who, for any given communicating sensor pair, can identify and capture that node throughout the rest of the sensornet (or locally, in the case of the limited adversary which contains the keys used for communication between the given pair. In other words, this metric asks us to first select the (logical) link in the sensornet. The adversary is then allowed to freely capture that node from the remaining N − 2 nodes which will maximally compromize communication over the selected link. In reality, this situation can be used to model vulnerability in the presence of the lucky adversary who is able to (fortuitously) capture that sensor node which can maximally compromize the given link, no matter its location within the sensornet. We can analytically express this security metric as follows:
Pr[A given q-composite link is vulnerable] = Pr[∃ a node containing all p ≥ q common keys].
where we assume that if a node pair contains p > q keys, then all p keys are used for communication.
We analytically evaluate and compare the vulnerabilities of 2-Phase and the random key predistribution scheme under this metric. The fundamental difference between the two predistribution schemes is that a given link is more vulnerable under 2-Phase if a node from a small set (depending on the inheritance factor f , the desired q-compositeness and the LID difference between communicating nodes) is captured and less vulnerable if the captured node lies outside this set, whereas the given link is equally vulnerable to any node capture under random key predistribution 3 . Proof. Let V SC Rand (V SC 2P ) denote the vulnerability of a given communication link to single node capture (network-wide) by an omniscient adversary. Consider any two q-composite neighboring sensors i and j (j > i) sharing α keys, α ≥ q. Under random key predistribution, the probability that any other sensor contains all of these α keys in its key space is
is invulnerable to single node capture by an omniscient adversary iff no other node in the network shares these α keys with i. Therefore we have
For the 2-phase scheme, denote P (l α , p α ): Probability that two nodes l and p share exactly α keys.
P (l α c |i α , jα) : Probability a node l does not contain the entire keyset α given that i and j share exactly α keys.
α ): Probability a node l does not contain the entire keyset α given that node l − 1 contains it.
Probability a node l does not contain the entire keyset α given that node l − 1 also does not contain it. Now we have the following:
Let P m denote the probability that there are m keys from keyset α available in the random pool for a node l (i.e the pool of size L − f k from which node l chooses k − f k keys randomly, after inheriting f k keys from its ancestor). If it is given that node l − 1 does not contain all α keys, then 1 ≤ m ≤ α. For l = 2, . . . , i − 1, i + 2, . . . , j − 1, j + 2, . . . , N − 1 we have,
since the smallest value of P α|(l−1) α c occurs when node l − 1 contains α − 1 keys from the keyset. Similarly we can derive
Finally, we consider the probability that node i + 1 does not contain these α keys given that i and j share exactly α keys. Note that by the 2-Phase inheritance rule i + 1 inherits some keys from i and passes some of them on to j (unlike node j + 1 which only inherits from j). Thus this probability is different from the case of node j + 1. We derive a lower bound on this probability by considering the event that the capture of node i + 1 does not reveal all the common keys between i and j, regardless of the number of such keys.
does not contain α common keys between i, j)
≥ P (i + 1 does not contain any number of common keys between i, j) = k β=0 P (i β , (i + 1) β ) · P (j contains at least one key from remaining k − β keys of i)
Equation 15 , the probability that the capture of node i + 1 does not reveal all common keys between i and j, is obtained by noting that j must contain at least one key from node i's remaining k − β keys, where i and i + 1 share β keys. This probability is least when node j − 1 contains none of these k − β keys (they are thus all present in j's random key pool) and j must therefore obtain at least one key from this keyset while selecting k − f k keys from its random pool.
The 2-Phase invulnerability of an arbitrary α-composite edge (i, j) under single node capture by an omniscient adversary is the probability that no node l contains these keys given that node l − 1 also does not contain them (except nodes i + 1 and j + 1). Thus we have
Putting together Equations 12-15, we obtain a lower bound on the 2-Phase edge vulnerability as:
where X is independent of N .
Comparing the dominant asymptotic terms of Equation 16 with Equation 11
along with some elementary algebraic manipulations, we can show that V SC 2P < V SC Rand if
which is true for all practical values of key compositeness α and f k.
Average-Case Adversary
We now analyze edge vulnerability when the capture of any single node in the network by the adversary is equally likely. Let i and j be any two sensors in radio range and suppose the adversary captures node l. The vulnerability of edge (i, j) is the expectation (over all nodes l) that node l contains all the keys in common between i and j. However, this vulnerability only makes sense when edge (i, j) exists under a q-composite regime and thus we define a new vulnerability metric V C for the sensornet as follows: Proof. Let i and j be any two sensors in radio range with α keys in common, α ≥ q. Denote P (i α , j α ) as the probability that i and j have exactly α keys in common and P (l α | i α , j α ) as the probability that node l = i, j contains the keyset α. For random key predistribution, this is equal to
To analyze the 2-Phase scheme, we divide the N − 2 remaining nodes into two sets: A = {l : l < i, l > j} and B = {i + 1, i + 2, . . . , j − 1}, where |A| = x and |B| = y. The event that the capture of a node l reveals all keys between i and j is the event of l containing a superset of the common keys between i and j. Assume that i and j share exactly α keys. Then we have the following two cases: Case 1: l ∈ A: Note that if l ∈ A, it is in fact more likely to have a subset of α as shown below (due to the 2-Phase key inheritance mechanism when l follows j or precedes i)
where P ((l − 1) β ) in the above recursive equation is the probability that node l − 1 contains β of these α keys.
Let
It can be shown that for practical values of k and L, the key inheritance effect dies out for z ≥ log 1/f k. Hence node l − 1 is most likely to contain none of the α keys (i.e β = 0) and l has to obtain these α keys from its random keyspace. Therefore we can approximate the edge invulnerability as:
where the second condition is the same as Equation 14 . Case 2: l ∈ B: The event that l contains common keys of i and j is more likely when l is in between i and j, since l first inherits from i and then passes on some keys to j. However, note that the vulnerability metric is meaningful only for existing q-composite links in the sensornet, i.e. for those nodes i and j that share at least q keys. As the desired q-composite value increases, the probability of |B| being large and i and j simultaneously having ≥ q common keys decreases significantly. As described in Section 7, a good choice of f , k and L is to ensure that the expected number of keys between two nodes with LID difference N/M is q, where M is the number of clusters in the network. Hence in this implementation, we can restrict the LID communication radius of a node (i.e the LID ranges of the nodes i can establish an edge with) to a small multiple of N/M . Therefore we note that for all practical values of q-compositeness, |B| << |A| (although this is not necessary for the correctness of this proposition).
Define, P (i β , l β ) · P (j contains at least one key from remaining k − β keys of i)
using the fact that the probability of node i and node
L keys is maximum (from Proposition 2).
Note that for x > log 1/f k, Equation 19 rapidly approaches one and if |B| > log 1/f k, we can write (the expression for the vulnerability metric under the random scheme) using elemntary algebraic manipulation proves the proposition.
Expected Fraction of Links Compromised when One Node is Captured Under qcomposite Communication Scheme
Consider a particular cluster C. Let c be the LID of the captured node and i and j be LIDs of any two other nodes in the cluster. Also, let x be the LID difference between the captured node and the closest of the other two nodes. So, x = min(| c − i |, | c − j |). To derive the expected number of links compromised in a cluster when one node is captured, we define an indicator variable Z ij in the following manner:
1 if i and j share a keys and all these a keys are possessed by c 0 otherwise (21) . So, total number of links L comp compromised in C is given by:
Hence, expected number of compromised links in C is given by:
P (i and j share a keys and all these a keys are possessed by c)
Expressions for P x (a) and P |i−j| (a) are given in the previous section. These probabilities are the same for any pair i and j under the random scheme. In conjunction with the above technique , f can also be chosen to ensure a desired minimum level of invulnerability using any of the metrics in Section 6. For example, f can be chosen so as to minimize the worst-case probability that the capture of a single node (i.e node i + 1) can reveal all shared keys for a typical communication link (i, j) between nodes i and j separated by an average LID difference of N/M .
Simulation Results
We present sensornet security and performance results based on simulations carried out on a 1000 node network using a key pool ranging from 8000-10000 keys. The per-node key space k varies from 80-150 keys. We assume that nodes are deployed in clusters as in LEACH [7] . Cluster sizes vary from 20 to 50. We have evaluated the two-phase key distribution scheme for f = 0.5 on average. Note that nodes belonging to different clusters do not communicate directly and therefore, secure connectivity results can be presented with respect to an average cluster. Figures 1-3 describe some q-composite network connectivity metrics while Figures 4-8 describe several sensornet security metrics. Figures 1-3 describe the average q-composite degree of a node for different values of q. As can be seen clearly, the average degree is increasingly higher under 2-Phase and thus it increasingly outperforms the random key pre-distribution as q increases.
Figures 4-8 describe several sensornet security metrics. First, Figure 4 illustrates a measure of communication security (i.e invulnerability) by describing the average number of exclusive keys per pair of nodes in a cluster. This number is higher for nodes under 2-Phase than using the random scheme. Figures 5, 6 and 7 measure sensornet security under multiple node capture in a cluster and show that the average number of links exposed to the enemy in the random scheme is always higher compared to the 2-Pphase scheme.
An intuitive explanation of the results in Figures 4-7 lies in the key inheritance 'bubble' effect. Although a node inherits keys from its ancestors, the effect of this inheritance is significant only within a LID bubble of log 1 f (k) ancestors and predecessors (by LID). Outside that bubble, the expected number of shared keys between two nodes is approximately equal to that under the random scheme. However, for a reasonable cluster size and a small bubble size, it is unlikely that there will be more than two nodes within each others s bubbles.
In Figure 8 , we estimate the probability that a pair of nodes possesses at least one exclusive key under the 2-Phase key pre-distribution scheme. This probability is always positive and it rises sharply as the number of keys possessed by each node increases. We have already discussed that the security of a communication link strengthens if the key used for securing this link is not used in any other link. Based on this observation, we propose that for mutual communication each pair of nodes must use a key which is shared among least number of nodes. During the shared key discovery phase, each node discovers its logical neighbors i.e., the neighbors with whom it shares at least one key. We propose the following metric to evaluate each shared key from this point of view.
Let k be a key shared between any two nodes with id i and j and let S ij (k) denote the set of nodes in the neighborhood of i and j which share this node k. Therefore, the eligibility of this key k with respect to the pair of nodes i and j is defined as:
. Note that the higher is the value of E ij (k), the better is the key k for communication between i and j. During the shared key discovery phase, each node broadcasts the list of identifiers of the keys it possesses. Each node then create a separate list of shared keys for each of its neighbors sorted according to their eligibility values. The most eligible key will be used for communication until it is revoked. 
Conclusion
Efficient pre-distribution of keys to sensor nodes is a very important issue for secure communication in sensor networks. Connectivity and resiliency to enemy attacks must be traded off very carefully. In this paper, we present an analytical framework with several metrics for estimating this trade off and evaluating a key pre-distribution. We also present a key pre-distribution based on inheritance property and randomness which is proved to have better over-all performance than the random key pre-distribution scheme. Proof. The event that no key is shared between two nodes is equivalent to the event that none of the keys in the key ring of one node is selected by the other. Without loss of generality, we consider a particular ordering of keys in the key ring of one node and we define Ai as the event that the ith key from the key ring of the node is selected by the other node given that previous (i − 1) keys from that key ring are not selected it, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Therefore, probability that none of the keys from the key ring of one node is selected by the other one is
). Under the random key pre-distribution, let P ran be the probability that two nodes share at least one key. Therefore,
Under the two-phase scheme, we define p i x as the probability that event Ai occurs with two nodes of id difference x. Let P two−p x be the probability that two nodes with id difference x shares at least one key. Therefore,
To derive the expression for p i x , we take two nodes with id 1 and id x + 1 without loss of generality. In this scheme, there are three possible ways by which a particular key can be selected by a node with id x + 1. If the key is in the key ring of its parent i.e., the node with id x, there are two possibilities. The first possibility is that the key gets selected in the first phase. However, if it does not get selected in the first phase, it may get selected in the second phase when the keys are drawn from the key pool. The third possibility is that it is not possessed by the node x and hence node x + 1 selects it in the second phase from the key pool. Let us define the following events: B1: Event that the key is selected from the key ring of the parent node given that the parent possesses it. B2: Event that the key does not get selected in the first phase and it gets selected in the phase given that the parent node possesses it. C: Event that the key is selected from the key pool given that the parent node does not possess this key. Therefore, p Given a particular j ≤ k − f k, since those f k keys are drawn from k − j keys, we have,
And (28) 
Then,p
x is given by the following recurrence relation:
Note that the base case here is the probability that the ith key is possessed by the node with id difference 0 i.e., the node who already contains the key. Therefore the base case probability is 1. Let this probability be denoted by p0. Note that event Ai is meaningless in this case.
Solving the above equation we get,
Now,
Now, the term 1
in the expression of 1 − P ran corresponds to 1 − p i x in the expression of 1 − P two−p x for all i. We have,
x for all i and for any x
Hence, probability that no key is shared between any two nodes is higher under the random key distribution than that under the two-phase key-distribution.
A.2 Proof Of Proposition 2
Proof. Let P ran denote the probability that a node shares at least one key with another node. Since each node select its keys independently, the number of nodes with whom a node has at least one key in common follows Binomial distribution with parameters m and P ran . Therefore, expected degree of a node within a cluster of size m is (m − 1) × P ran , where P ran is given as:
In the two-phase key distribution scheme, the probability that two nodes share at least one key depends on the order in which they were given the keys. Therefore, distributions of number of logical neighbors of different nodes are not independent of each other. We derive the expected degree of each node in a cluster of size m in the following manner.
Let Xr denote the number of nodes with which the node with id r shares at least one key. We define an indicator variable Yri for i = 1, 2, ..r − 1, r + 1, ..N in the following way: Yri = 1 if node r and i has at least one common key 0 otherwise
Let Pi be the probability that two nodes with id difference i has at least one common key. Then, for all i = 1, 2, ..r − 1, r + 1, ..N . Therefore,
where l1 = min(r − 1, N − r) and l2 = max(r − 1, N − r). ¿From Proposition 1, we have Pi ≥ P ran for all i. Therefore,
Hence, the proof.
A.3 Proof Of Proposition 3
Proof. First, we derive expected number of shared keys between any two nodes when the key pre-distribution scheme is totally random. Let Y denote the number of shared keys between any two nodes. Then the probability mass function of Y is given by:
This is a hypergeometric distribution with parameters L, k and k. Therefore,
Next, we derive the expected number of shared keys between two nodes under the two-phase key pre-distribution. Here, the probability distribution of number of shared keys will depend upon the ids of the two nodes involved. Without loss of generality, we derive the expected number of keys shared between two nodes with ids i and i + x. Let Y be the number of keys shared between nodes i and i + x, 0 ≤ Y ≤ k. A key from the key ring of ith node can be selected for the node i + x either from the key ring of its immediate ancestor i.e., node i + x − 1 or from the remaining key pool. Thus, Y = Y1 + Y2, where Y1 is the number of keys shared between nodes i and i + x through the node i + x − 1 and Y2 is that selected through the remaining key pool of size L − f k after excluding f k nodes that are selected already.
Let T be the number of keys shared between nodes i and i + x − 1, 0 ≤ T ≤ k. Therefore, the probability distribution of Y1 is given by:
Thus, Y1 follows a hypergeometric distribution with parameters T , k and f k. Similarly, Y2 follows a hypergeometric distribution with parameters k − y1, L − y1 and (1 − f )k. Expectation of Y can be written as:
Let us denote Ex as the expected number of keys shared between nodes with id difference x. Then we have the following equation:
Thus, the solution to the above recurrence equation is as follows:
It is evident that for any f between 0 and 1 and any value of k and L ,
> 0 and k L < 1. Hence, the proof.
A.4 Proof Of Proposition 6
Proof. Under the random key pre-distribution scheme, a particular key is selected by a node is k/L. Since, keys are drawn for each node independently, number of nodes sharing a particular key follows Binomial distribution with parameters m and k/L. Therefore, expected number of nodes per key is mk/L.
Under the two-phase key distribution scheme, let px be the probability that a particular key is selected by a node with id x. To derive px, let us define the following events. A1: Event that the key is selected from the key ring of the parent node given that the parent possesses it. A2: Event that the key does not get selected in the first phase and it gets selected in the phase given that the parent node possesses it. B: Event that the key is selected from the key pool given that the parent node does not possess this key. 
Thus, the probability that a key will be possessed by a node is independent of the id of that node. However, in this scheme, the event that a particular key is possessed by a node is not independent of the event that it is possessed by another node. Therefore, number of nodes per key under this scheme does not follow a Binomial distribution as it does under the random key distribution scheme. So, we derive the expected number of nodes per key under this scheme in the following way.
Let us fix a key and a cluster and define two indicator variables Ti and Zi for node i, i = 1, 2, ..N such that: 
